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“Privilege is embedded in the question ‘Why would you say
that?’ There’s a lack of understanding about the relationship
between people of color and the police. It’s scary to be black and
brown and face a police officer.”
-Ava DuVernay1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1989, New York Police Department officers arrested
five boys for the rape of a jogger in Central Park.2 The victim was
white.3 The accused were Black and Latino.4 Detectives
interrogated the five separately, all of whom made incriminating

*Associate Professor of Law, UIC John Marshall Law School. The authors
thank the UIC John Marshall Law School Law Review for the invitation to
contribute this article and the UIC John Marshall Law School Anti-Racism and
Social Justice Fund for providing additional research support.
** Staff Attorney, Superior Court of California, County of San Diego County,
and former Public Defender for the County of San Diego and Federal Defenders
of San Diego, Inc. The author thanks the attorneys at Federal Defenders of San
Diego, Inc. for their persistence in fighting systemic injustice and inspiring the
author in her contributions to this article.
1. See Kate Storey, ‘When They See Us’ Shows the Disturbing Truth About
How False Confessions Happen, ESQUIRE (June 1, 2019), www.esquire.com/ent
ertainment/a27574472/when-they-see-us-central-park-5-false-confessions/
[perma.cc/9QJ5-HPM5]. Ava DuVernay is the director of When They See Us, a
television mini-series about the Central Park Five.
2. Jim Dwyer, The True Story of How a City in Fear Brutalized the Central
Park Five, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2019, at AR1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
773
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statements over some thirty hours of continuous questioning.5 The
boys later recanted their statements, arguing that the detectives
coerced the confessions.6 Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
statements were voluntary and admissible.7 At trial, a jury heard
the boys’ statements and – based largely on that evidence –
returned a guilty verdict against each one.8 The boys, who became
known as the Central Park Five, spent between six and thirteen
years in prison before exculpatory DNA proved their innocence.9
They ultimately reached a financial settlement with New York
City.10
Though the trial captivated New Yorkers more than thirty
years ago, a 2012 documentary (The Central Park Five) and a 2019
television mini-series (When They See Us) sparked new interest in
the case from broader audiences.11 In most corners, the attention
was rightly coupled with a sense of outrage over the litany of
injustices that corrupted the case from its beginnings.12 The boys’
false confessions and the tactics used by police to extract them
generated particular anger and incredulity.13 Exonerations based
on DNA and other categorical evidence of innocence have exposed
dangerous flaws in police interrogation techniques and strategies.
Still, the evidence rules governing the admissibility of statements
obtained from those flawed processes have remained largely intact
since the prosecution of the Central Park Five.14 Further, systemic
racism continues to infect the whole of the criminal justice system.15
5. Evan Nestarak, Coerced to Confess: The Psychology of False Confessions,
BEHAV. SCIENTIST (Oct. 21, 2014), www.behavioralscientist.org/coerced-toconfess-the-psychology-of-false-confessions/ [perma.cc/VSZ7-XZUW].
6. Id.
7. Dwyer, supra note 2.
8. See Carl Suddler, How the Central Park Five Expose the Fundamental
Injustice in Our Court System, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019),
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/12/how-central-park-five-exposefundamental-injustice-our-legal-system/
[perma.cc/RST7-SQ42]
(“Forced
confessions were enough to land four of the five in the juvenile system [and the
fifth] who was sixteen at the time of his arrest landed in the adult system
because, up until 2018, New York prosecuted 16- and 17-year-olds as adults.”).
9. Dwyer, supra note 2.
10. Aisha Harris, The Central Park Five: ‘We Were Just Baby Boys’, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2019, at AR 12.
11. THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Sundance Selects 2012); WHEN THEY SEE US
(Netflix 2019).
12. Suddler, supra note 8.
13. Storey, supra note 1 (“The [interrogation] scenes are painful to watch as
the young actors portray the pain and desperation of hour after hour of
deceptive interrogation.”).
14. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (“An Opposing Party’s Statement.
The statement is offered against an opposing party and: (A) was made by the
party in an individual or representative capacity”), with FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(A) (1975) (amended 2014); id. (“Admission by party-opponent.—The
statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity.”).
15. For a broader discussion of systemic racism in the criminal justice
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These critiques hold true in both state and federal prosecutions.16
Today, if the government offered a defendant’s self-inculpatory
statements in a prosecution akin to the Central Park Five, the rules
of evidence would almost certainly allow for their admission at
trial.17
This Article endeavors to show how Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A), which controls the admissibility of statements by
criminal defendants, perpetuates privilege and fosters injustice. To
do so, we will examine the rule’s history. We will then consider how
the risk of false statements undermines the rule’s rationale for the
admissibility of statements by criminal defendants. Further, we
will explore the ways in which the rule functions to disadvantage
disproportionately criminal defendants of color. Finally, we will
propose a change to the rule to improve fairness in its use and
application against all criminal defendants at trial.

II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S
STATEMENTS UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES
The Federal Rules of Evidence include a generic restriction on
the admissibility of hearsay, i.e., a declarant’s out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted.18 The
prohibition is rooted in concerns that the declarant “might have
been lying” or “might have misperceived the events which he
relates” to the listener.19 In turn, the listener “might [have]
misunderstood or taken out of context” the declarant’s words.20 To
mitigate these hazards and to “encourage a witness to do his best,”

system, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2d ed. 2020). Alexander writes that crime
control practices over the last thirty years created a “racial caste system” in
which “it is perfectly legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly all the
ways that it was once legal to discriminate against African Americans,
[including] employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the
right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other
public benefits, and exclusion from jury service[.]” Id. at 2.
16. Federal courts and all fifty states allow for the trial admissibility of
opposing party statements as non-hearsay.
17. Our Article does not consider the potential pre-trial due process
challenge associated with statements made by criminal defendants during
police interrogations. Rather, the Article assumes a pre-trial judicial
determination that a statement was voluntary. For a broader discussion of due
process and police interrogations, see Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 904
(2004).
18. FED. R. EVID. 802.
19. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994); FED. R. EVID. 801,
Advisory Committee Introductory Note to Article VIII (“The factors to be
considered in evaluating the testimony of a witness are perception, memory,
and narration.”).
20. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598.
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“the Anglo-American tradition” requires that a witness’s testimony
is given “under oath,” “in the personal presence” of the judge and
jury, and “subject to cross-examination.”21 Still, there are myriad
exceptions to the hearsay prohibition.22 Rule 801(d)(2)(A),
governing opposing party statements made by an individual, cuts a
particularly broad swath through the ban on hearsay.23
As evidentiary rules go, Rule 801(d)(2)(A) is simple and
straightforward.24 In a civil or criminal case, an out-of-court
statement is admissible for its truth if “made by the party in an
individual or representative capacity,” and offered into evidence by
the party’s adversary.25 Perhaps for that reason, the rule has not
been the topic of significant interpretive debate.26 In civil cases,
either party may take advantage of the benefits conferred by the
rule.27 In criminal cases, the government may offer statements
attributed to defendants.28 The rule, however, does not necessarily
function in reverse fashion.29 At common law, the government was
considered “an objective representative of the public” not an
“opposing party.”30 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
circuits are split as to whether the government can ever fall within
the rule’s ambit.31

21. FED. R. EVID. 801, Advisory Committee Introductory Note to Article VIII.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804.
23. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Technically speaking, opposing party
statements are “excluded” from the hearsay ban and not considered “exceptions”
to the ban. However, the effect at trial is the same – the statement is admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, an opposing party statement was generally considered an
“exception” to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970);
see also Edmund M. Morgan, Admission as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
30 YALE L.J. 355, 361 (1921) (“[U]pon both principle and authority, extrajudicial verbal admissions by a party to an action are receivable in evidence
under an exception to the rule against hearsay.”).
24. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE
MANUAL STUDENT EDITION 13-15 (9th ed. 2011) (“All that is required is that a
statement made by a party is offered into evidence by an adverse party.”).
25. Id.
26. FED. R. EVID. 801, Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(2)(A)
(referring to “party’s own statement [as] the classic example of an admission”);
see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974) (stating that in
criminal cases, statements made by an accused prior to arrest are admissible
against him admissions).
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
28. Jared M. Kelson, Government Admissions and Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A), 103 VA. L. REV. 355, 356-57 (2017); Anne Bowen Poulin, Party
Admission in Criminal Cases: Should the Government Have to Eat its Words?,
87 MINN. L. REV. 401, 404 (2002) (“Party admissions do not bind the
government, but they are powerful evidence.”).
29. Kelson, supra note 28, at 356-57.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Poulin, supra note 28, at 415 (noting that Rule 801(d)(2)(A) “provides
no support for the argument that party admissions operate differently against
the government [but] some courts continue to resist admitting party admissions
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In its initial form, the rule covered an “opposing party’s
admissions.”32 In 2011, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence replaced the term “admissions” with “statements.”33 The
replacement is essentially semantic.34 The purpose and function of
the rule remains unchanged.35 Otherwise, the Advisory
Committee’s Notes state plainly that an opposing party’s
statements are admissible based “on the theory that their
admissibility is the result of the adversary system rather than the
satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.”36 Importantly, the
hallmark condition for the admissibility of an out-of-court
statement is its “guarantee of trustworthiness.”37 Therefore, no
guarantee of trustworthiness is required for the admission of an
opposing party statement.38 The Advisory Committee views the
rule’s lack of reliability safeguards through a lens of liberation,
describing “the freedom which admissions have enjoyed from the
technical demands of searching for an assurance of
trustworthiness.”39 In turn, the absence of “restrictive influences . .
. calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.”40
The rule’s origins support the Advisory Committee’s
interpretation.41 In 1921, Edmund Morgan, the primary author of
the Model Code of Evidence, explained the rationale of the
“adversary system” as grounds for admission of opposing party
statements.42 The witness, Morgan observed, “must confront the
very person whose statements he is reporting” and “is subject to

against the government, particularly in criminal cases”).
32. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 26.
33. Id.
34. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUNNE, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 550
(7th ed. 2011) (“[N]ot all statements covered by the exclusion are admissions in
the colloquial sense – a statement can be within the exclusion even if it
‘admitted’ nothing[.]”).
35. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 26.
36. Id.
37. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for the Hearsay
Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2016).
38. Id. (“Rule 801(d)(2) is different from the true hearsay ‘exceptions’
because those require a guarantee of trustworthiness.”).
39. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 26.
40. Id.; see also Zachary Bolitho, The Hearsay and Confrontation Clause
Problems Caused by Admitting What a Non-Testifying Interpreter Said the
Criminal Defendant Said, 49 N.M. L. REV. 193, 199 (2019) (noting that
statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2) are “one of the most common reasons
why out-of-court statements are admitted during trials”).
41. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 361 (“[I]t is too obvious for comment that
the party whose declarations are offered against him is in no position to object
on the score of lack of confrontation or of lack of opportunity for crossexamination. It seems quite as clear that he ought not to be heard to complain
that he was not under oath.”).
42. Id. The Model Code of Evidence, a predecessor to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, was adopted by the American Law Institute in May 1942.

778

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

cross-examination by counsel who has at his elbow the person who
knows all the facts and circumstances of the alleged statements.”43
Further, “the [opposing party]-declarant may himself go upon the
stand and deny, qualify or explain the alleged admissions.”44
Notably, Morgan reasoned that – like excited utterances and other
spontaneous declarations – an opposing party’s out-of-court
statements are more likely to be “trustworthy and free from bias”
than the party’s subsequent trial testimony.45 Quoting nineteenthcentury common law, he concluded, “What a party himself admits
to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so.”46

III. OPPOSING PARTY STATEMENTS AND THE RISK OF
FALSE CONFESSIONS
The uncontroversial history of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) belies its
troubling connection to wrongful convictions. In his 1923 evidence
treatise – a text that still holds considerable sway today – John
Henry Wigmore declared that false confessions were “scarcely
conceivable” and “of the rarest occurrence.”47 The emergence of
exculpatory DNA as a central basis for exonerations, however, has
proved Wigmore wrong.48 Indeed, false statements by defendants
are a leading cause of wrongful convictions.49 The National Registry
of Exonerations reports that 13-percent of DNA-based exonerations
involved false statements by defendants used at trial.50 Moreover,
43. Id.; WEISSENBERGER & DUNNE, supra note 34, at 551 (“In essence, this
doctrine is predicated on an estoppel theory.”).
44. Morgan, supra note 23, at 361 (noting that an opposing party “is given
every opportunity to qualify and explain” a statement).
45. Id. (comparing the trustworthiness of an opposing party statement to a
statement regarding “presently existing mental or subjective bodily condition,
or a spontaneous exclamation”).
46. Id. (citing Slatterie v. Pooley, 151 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1840)).
Interestingly, the Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 1007 (“Testimony
or Statement to Prove Content”) challenges Slatterie’s logic in the context of
document production. The Committee writes, “While [Slatterie] allows proof of
contents by evidence of an oral admission by the party against whom offered,
without accounting for non-production of the original, the risk of inaccuracy is
substantial[.]” Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1007. Therefore, Rule 1007
“[limits] this use of admissions to those made in the course of giving testimony
or in writing.” Id.
47. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 18 (2011).
48. Drizin & Leo, supra note 17 (commenting that “[t]he most significant
development in wrongful conviction scholarship in the 1990s was the advent of
increasingly sophisticated forms of DNA testing and the application of this new
technology to criminal investigation” and citing an early study in which 18percent of exonerations involved false confessions”).
49. Id. at 906-07 (reporting false confessions in fourteen to twenty-five
percent of the total miscarriages of justices studied, “thus establishing the
problem of false confessions as a leading cause of the wrongful convictions of
the innocent in America”).
50. Samuel Gross & Maurice Possley, For Fifty Years, You’ve Had “The Right
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that figure “deeply understates” the ubiquity of the problem as
many cases involving false statements by defendants do not have
DNA or other categorical evidence of innocence “to rescue them.’51
Further, even exculpatory DNA may be insufficient for a case to
overcome a defendant’s false statement and end in exoneration.52
Finally, a defendant’s false statement may never reach the ears of
the jury if suppressed by the judge before trial.53
Writer and filmmaker Ava DuVernay describes the
circumstances giving rise to the Central Park Five’s false
confessions as a “petri dish of injustice.”54 To DuVernay’s point,
police custodial interrogations are an especially dangerous source
for statements attributed to defendants at trial.55 Arrestees are
isolated in windowless rooms, usually without access to counsel.56
They often waive their Miranda rights, tilting the balance of power
heavily toward law enforcement interrogators.57 Interrogations may
persist for hours on end, increasing the arrestee’s stress, fatigue,
to Remain Silent,”, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 12, 2016), www.themarshallp
roject.org/2016/06/12/for-50-years-you-ve-had-the-right-to-remain-silent
[perma.cc/CTP4-CCAW]; see also ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 30 (2015) (citing false confessions as “a factor
in about 25 percent of all post-conviction exonerations”).
51. Gross & Possley, supra note 50; see also GARRETT, supra note 47, at 18
(“[W]e do not know how often false confessions occur[.]”).
52. Gross & Possley, supra note 50 (discussing a Lake County, Illinois case
involving a defendant’s false confession, the subsequent discovery of
exculpatory DNA, and his re-conviction after a subsequent trial).
53. Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 956-57.
54. Storey, supra note 1.
55. One of the authors has previously written about an initiative by the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to expand Rule
801(d)(1)(A) to allow for admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements for
their truth, including statements made during police interrogations. The
expansion has not been adopted and, currently, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) covers only
prior inconsistent statements given under penalty of perjury at trial, deposition,
or other qualifying proceedings. See Hugh Mundy, Forward Progress: A New
Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction for Impeachment with Prior Inconsistent
Statements Will Ease the Court’s Burden by Emphasizing the Prosecutor’s, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1455 (2016).
56. See Bryan L. Sykes, Eliza Solowiej & Evelyn J. Patterson, The Fiscal
Savings of Accessing the Right to Legal Counsel Within Twenty-Four Hours of
Arrest: Chicago and Cook County, 2013, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 813, 816, 819
(2015) (documenting that only 0.2 percent of men arrested in Cook County,
Illinois, had a defense lawyer at the police station; about eighty percent of
arrestees waived their Miranda rights).
57. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); BENFARADO, supra note 50, at
31 (“Indeed, it is innocent people who are more likely to waive their rights to
remain silent and to have a lawyer present[.]”); see also Saul M. Cassin &
Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of
Innocence, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 212-13, 216 (2004) (discussing the various
reasons for Miranda waivers, including police officers strategically establishing
rapport to induce waivers, suspects waving rights due to their lack of criminal
justice “experience,” or suspects who wish to protect their innocence believing
“apparently, in the power of truth to prevail”).
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and fear.58 Not surprisingly, the inherently coercive interrogation
environment invites false statements — especially as to arrestees
who are threatened with harsher treatment or additional charges
without confessing or naming the true culprit.59
Further, police are trained to elicit incriminating statements
from arrestees using “a range of psychologically coercive and
deceptive tactics” – including lies that forensic evidence has proved
the suspect’s guilt, promises of leniency in return for a confession,
and feigned empathy for the suspect’s plight.60 These strategies –
all associated with the so-called “Reid Technique” of interrogation –
not only fail to guard against false statements “but actually appear
to encourage them.”61 More problematically, the law enforcement
officer who interrogated the defendant generally testifies at trial as
to the defendant’s statements.62 The officer’s motivation to secure a
conviction, however, often comes at the cost of truthful testimony.63

58. BENFORADO, supra note 50, at 31; see also Lisa Black & Steve Mills,
What Causes People to Give False Confessions?, CHI. TRIB. (July 11, 2010),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2010-07-11-ct-met-forced-confessions20100711-story.html [perma.cc/3YPF-6KJB]. (“Trauma, lack of sleep, and
highly manipulative interrogation techniques are a few factors that can cause
the most level-headed people to confess to a crime[.]”).
59. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010) (noting that the “singleminded purpose” of interrogation is “not to discern the truth” but “to elicit
incriminating statements . . . in an effort to secure the conviction of offenders”).
60. GARRETT, supra note 47, at 22-23.
61. BENFARADO, supra note 50, at 30. Custodial interrogations aside, the
“Reid Technique” has produce false statements in non-custodial investigative
interviews. In a 2008 study of the influence of police interviewing techniques,
researchers asked college students a series of questions about the instigator of
a computer crash. After a “relatively low-pressure” interview, fourty-five
percent of the participants falsely implicated a peer. See Kirk A. B. Newring &
William O’Donohue, False Confessions and Influenced Witnesses, 4 APPLIED
PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 81, 87–90, 98 (2008). The Reid Technique begins with a
Behavioral Analysis Interview during which the officer “determine[s] whether
the suspect is lying” based on the suspect’s verbal responses and non-verbal
cues. Douglas Star, The Interview, NEW YORKER (Dec. 2, 2013),
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/the-interview-7
[perma.cc/2JBVX9MA]. If the officer believes the suspect is dishonest, the officer leaves the
interrogation setting briefly and returns “with an official-looking folder”
purportedly containing incriminating evidence. Id. The officer then begins an
interrogation designed to “[prod] the suspect toward confession.” Id.
62. Federal law enforcement agencies must record interrogations. Half of
the states in the country and the District of Columbia have similar policies.
While the practice reduces the risk of officer perjury, testimony is nonetheless
required to authenticate a recording and provide additional details about the
interrogation. See False Confessions and Recording of Custodial Interrogations,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessions-recordinginterrogations/ [perma.cc/ZXL3-S9XZ] (last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
63. See Michelle Alexander, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-un
der-oath.html [perma.cc/J2LX-2U3F] (“In the War on Drugs, federal grant
programs like the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program
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Concerns over trustworthiness notwithstanding, a defendant’s
inculpatory statement remains “the most probative and damaging
evidence” that can be offered by the prosecution at trial.64

IV. RULE 801(D)(2)(A) DISPROPORTIONATELY
DISADVANTAGES CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS OF COLOR
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that race-based
discrimination “is odious in all aspects, [but] especially pernicious
in the administration of justice.”65 Still, the race-based disparities
among those prosecuted in criminal court are manifest. Black men
are more likely than Caucasian men to be arrested, to be convicted,
and to receive long prison sentences.66 Black men are incarcerated
at nearly six times the rate of Caucasian men.67 Hispanic men are
almost three times as likely as Caucasian men to be imprisoned68
One in every three Black boys born in 2001 could expect to go to
prison in his lifetime, as could one of every six Hispanic boys—
compared to one of every seventeen Caucasian boys.69 In the
Southern District of New York, the nation’s most populous, Black
and Hispanic men comprise about one-third of the general
population but roughly seventy percent of criminal defendants.70
Nationally, only one-quarter of federal criminal defendants are nonHispanic whites.71
Based on a quantitative analysis alone, Rule 801(d)(2)(A)
have encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to boost drug arrests
in order to compete for millions of dollars in funding. Law enforcement has
increasingly become a numbers game.”); Mark Joseph Stern, The Police Lie. All
the Time. Is There Anything We Can Do to Stop Them?, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2020),
www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/08/police-testilying.html
[perma.cc/T37N-EVXE] (citing police incentives to lie, including concerns that
illegally obtained evidence will be suppressed and fears about disciplinary
actions).
64. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quoting Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968)).
65. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2017) (quoting Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 555 (1979)).
66. The Sentencing Project, Report of The Sentencing Project to the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Regarding Racial
Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System 1 (2018)
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/UN-Report-on-RacialDisparities.pdf [perma.cc/KT4Y-AWPX].
67. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2018 at 9 T6 (Apr. 2020)
(In 2018, incarceration rates were 1,501 per 100,000 Black men, 797 per 100,000
Hispanic men, and 268 per 100,000 Caucasian men).
68. Id.
69. The Sentencing Project, supra note 66, at 1.
70. David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122
YALE L.J. 2578, 2590 (2013).
71. Id. at 2587.
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disproportionately impacts Black and Hispanic criminal
defendants.72 Worse still, race and ethnicity play a significant role
in the increased likelihood of false statements during questioning
by law enforcement.73 A comprehensive 2015 study of interrogations
revealed that, while Black and Caucasian suspects cooperated “at
similar rates,” police officers “were significantly more likely to
misjudge innocent Black suspects than innocent [Caucasian]
suspects.”74 Officers also found Black suspects “to be less
cooperative and less forthcoming” than Caucasian suspects,
notwithstanding contrary data.75 Further, an officer’s assessment
of a Black suspect’s “elevated stress level” – a sign the “Reid
Technique” calls a “cue to deception” – was often due to “the
[suspect’s] fear of being mistakenly judged as guilty.”76 In fact, the
dynamic resulted in “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” The Black suspect’s
awareness of the risk of being judged as guilty caused anxiety that
the police, in turn, interpreted as a sign of guilt.77 The same police
biases hold true for Hispanic people who are called in for
questioning.78 Popular perception, exacerbated by baseless
politically-motivated attacks, links Hispanic communities to “a
predisposition to violence, criminality, and membership in street
gangs.”79 Law enforcement views follow suit.80 Moreover, Hispanic
individuals are especially vulnerable to fall prey to police coercion
due to language barriers and fear of potential immigration
consequences.81
72. See James E. Johnson et al., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., N.Y. UNIV.
SCH. OF L., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 2 (2010),
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/ProsecutorialDiscreti
on_report.pdf [perma.cc/P7RH-BEZS].
73. Sara C. Appleby, Guilty Stereotypes: The Social Psychology of Race and
Suspicion in Police Interviews and Interrogations in Police Interviews and
Interrogations, CUNY ACAD. WORKS (2015), www.academicworks.cuny.edu/cg
i/viewcontent.cgi?article=1518&context=gc_etds [perma.cc/5F5E-9GVE].
74. Id. at iii.
75. Id. at iii-iv.
76. Id. at 3 (“The research on stereotype threat, concern about being
negatively evaluated based on one’s membership in a group, shows that being
stereotyped is an anxiety provoking process.”).
77. Id. at 3-4; see also J. Guillermo Villalobos & Deborah Davis,
Interrogation and the Minority suspect: Pathways to True and False Confession,
in 1 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOL. & L. (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein eds.,
2016).
78. Villalobos & Davis, supra note 77, at 4.
79. Id. at 23; Trump Goes on Offensive, Starting with an Attack on Harris,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/us/politics/trumpharris-biden-pennsylvania.html [perma.cc/VNX5-A3RC] (describing President
Trump’s efforts to “stoke fear of immigrants” at a Pennsylvania campaign rally).
80. Villalobos & Davis, supra note 77, at 23; Julia Arce, It's Long Past Time
We Recognized All the Latinos Killed at the Hands of Police, TIME (July 21,
2020), www.time.com/5869568/latinos-police-violence/ [perma.cc/36T4-V7Z3]
(“The names of Latinos killed by police go on and on, as is painfully clear at
Black Lives Matter protests.”).
81. Villalobos & Davis, supra note 77, at 25 (noting “widespread
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Of course, Rule 801(d)(2)(A) offers no safeguard against false
statements borne of coercion or compliance. The prosecution of
immigration crimes epitomizes the rule’s especially insidious
impact on defendants of color.82 In 2019, the most commonly
prosecuted federal offenses were immigration offenses, including
illegal entry and reentry.83 Between 2011 and 2016, the number of
immigration cases steadily declined—a trend which ended in
2017.84 Since 2017, immigration related prosecutions have steadily
increased, and, in 2019, 29,354 immigration cases were prosecuted
federally; a 22.9 percent increase from 2018. These cases share a
glaring commonality: Hispanic men accounted for 96.4 percent of
federal immigration cases in 2019.85
To secure a conviction for illegal reentry, the government must
prove the following elements:

misunderstanding of Miranda rights” caused by language barriers).
82. The disproportionate prosecution of Hispanic men under 8 U.S.C. §§
1325 and 1326 is not the result of historical accident. Federal laws criminalizing
immigration went into effect in 1929 and were drafted by Senator Coleman
Livingston Blease. See Ian McDougall, Behind the Criminal Immigration Law:
Eugenics and White Supremacy, PROPUBLICA (June 19, 2018), www.propub
lica.org/article/behind-the-criminal-immigration-law-eugenics-and-whitesupremacy [perma.cc/6GH5-ZWWK]; Kelly Lytle Hernandez, How Crossing the
US-Mexico Border Became a Crime, CONVERSATION (Apr 30, 2017),
www.theconversation.com/how-crossing-the-us-mexico-border-became-a-crime74604 [perma.cc/DNH2-CET4]; Libby Watson, How Crossing the Border
Became a Crime, SPLINTER NEWS (June 29, 2018), www.splinternews.com/howcrossing-the-border-became-a-crime-1827160001
[perma.cc/ZYG4-8W7A].
Blease frequently defended violence against non-white people, claiming, “the
morals and the mode of living between colored people are not up to the standard
adopted and lived up to by the white people.” Isaac Stanley-Becker, Who’s
Behind the Law Making Undocumented Immigrants Criminals? An
Unrepentant White Supremacist, WASH. POST (June 27, 2019), www
.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/27/julian-castro-beto-orourke-sectionimmigration-illegal-coleman-livingstone-blease/ [perma.cc/3YDN-SNZS]. The
bills were championed by Secretary of Labor, James Davis, who was a devout
eugenicist and believed that those with “tainted blood, weak mentality or
physical fault, threaten the whole physical, mental, and moral level of the
American people.”
James Davis, America and Her Immigrants, in 2
CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST 291 (Alice Gram ed., 1923).
83. Immigration related offenses include felony prosecutions for illegal
reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and misdemeanor prosecutions for illegal entry
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2020), www.ussc.gov/sit
es/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2020/FY19_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[perma.cc/8AE9-H3NZ].
84. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2017), www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/p
df/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[perma.cc/4N7R-HDRE].
85. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2019, supra note 83.
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“(1) [the] Defendant was, at the time of the offense, an alien; (2) [the]
Defendant had been lawfully deported or removed from the United
States; (3) subsequent to this deportation or removal, [the]
Defendant was found in the United States after knowingly and
voluntarily reentering and thereafter remaining in the United
States; and (4) no representative of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security consented to [the]
Defendant's reentry or presence in the United States.”86

To prove the alienage element, the government may not simply rely
upon the existence of the defendant’s prior deportation or removal
orders.87 As a result, the government routinely moves to admit
statements made by defendants during immigration proceedings as
corroborating evidence to prove the element.88
To introduce statements made during immigration
proceedings, federal prosecutors often rely on Rule 801(d)(2)(A).89
In 2018, expedited removals — a form of immigration removal
proceeding — accounted for 43-percent of all immigration removals
from the United States.90 An expedited removal entails an
administrative process through which a Department of Homeland
Security agent processes an individual for removal from the United
States.91 The individual does not appear before an immigration
judge at any point in the process.92 The expedited removal process
includes the taking of a sworn statement by the detained individual,
which may be later admitted as an opposing party statement in a

86. United States v. Castro-Cabrera, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1157 (C.D. Cal.
2008).
87. United States v. Sotelo, 109 F.3d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a removal order, by itself, is insufficient evidence of illegal reentry due to the
differing standards of proof between criminal and immigration proceedings).
88. Id. (“The prosecution presented Sotelo's admissions to Agent Hess that
he is a Mexican citizen and his admissions during the deportation proceedings
that he is not a United States citizen.”); United States v. Gonzalez-Corn, 807
F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (“‘[N]either a deportation order, nor the
defendant's own admissions, standing alone,’ is sufficient to prove alienage.”
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ramirez–Cortez, 213 F.3d
1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000)); United States v. Ruiz–Lopez, 749 F.3d 1138, 1141
(9th Cir. 2014). “It is true a deportation order, on its own, is insufficient to
establish alienage.” Gonzalez-Corn, 807 F.3d at 996.
89. See United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.
2002), in which the government argues that statements contained within a
record of sworn statement taken during an immigration proceeding are a party
admission. See also United States v. Hermoso-Garcia, 475 F. App’x. 124, 126
(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that statements within the record of sworn statement
taken during the immigration proceedings fell within the hearsay exception for
“party admissions”).
90. MIKE GUO AND RYNA BAUGH, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2018 (Oct. 2019), www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publ
ications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2018/enforcement_actions_2018.pdf
[perma.cc/VB8S-P5W4].
91. Id.
92. Id.
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criminal immigration-related prosecution against the defendant.93
The statements made in expedited removal proceedings are, at
their best, of dubious reliability. In a congressionally-commissioned
study, observers routinely witnessed Department of Homeland
Security agents failing to follow the minimum mandated procedures
during the proceedings.94 This study includes the most recent data
on expedited removal proceedings and was commissioned under the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. While the primary
focus of the study was on asylum seekers, during the course of the
study, experts observed more than 400 inspections by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection agents at seven ports of entry and reviewed
over 900 case files.95 The Commission found widespread
inconsistencies in compliance with mandated procedures.96 In
expedited removal proceedings, 72-percent of the men subject to
removal failed to read – or have read to them – their sworn
statements, as required.97 Nonetheless, 100-percent signed and
attested to the accuracy of their statements.98 Agents failed to tell
15-percent of the men why they were signing the forms at all.99 In
other cases, sworn statements failed to include complete or relevant
information communicated by the individual.100 At the conclusion of
the study, the Commission issued a report with recommendations
designed to improve the integrity of the interview process.101 Two
years later, at the request of Congress, the Commission prepared a
follow-up report describing how agencies fared in implementing the
recommendations in the report.102 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection failed to implement a single recommendation and
received a failing grade.103
Accordingly, a disturbing trend in the use of statements under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A) in the prosecution of illegal entry and reentry
offenses emerges. Immigration-related offenses are the most

93. Id.
94. 1 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report
on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal (2005), www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/
files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf
[perma.cc/TQ76KRKD] [hereinafter Asylum Seekers: Volume I].
95. Id. at 3, 37. The methodology of the study was carefully developed,
requiring two specially trained observers to code their experience of their
observations of the expedited removal proceedings.
96. Id. at 4.
97. 2 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report
on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal 18-19 (2005), www.uscirf.go
v/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf
[perma.cc/3YJP-YDGR].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. ASYLUM SEEKERS: VOLUME I, supra note 94, at 57.
101. Id.
102. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXPEDITED REMOVAL
STUDY REPORT CARD: 2 YEARS LATER, at 3, 4 (2007).
103. Id.
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commonly prosecuted federal offenses, and the targets of such
prosecutions are largely Hispanic men.104 To convict an individual
of a violation of such an immigration-related offense, the
prosecution must prove alienage, which is commonly accomplished
through the introduction of an individual’s statements obtained
during their immigration proceedings.105 Studies establish that
these immigration proceedings are rife with inconsistency and
unreliability, and yet statements obtained during the course of
expedited removal proceedings may result in a criminal conviction
with the possibility of a twenty-year prison sentence.106 The use of
such problematic evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) should be
subject the evidentiary standard discussed below.

V. AMENDING RULE 801(D)(2)(A) TO REQUIRE A
“GUARANTEE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS”
Allowing for admissibility of a criminal defendant’s statement
solely as a byproduct of “the adversary system” is a relic of the
“Anglo-American [legal] tradition.”107 As a starting point, the
assumptions undergirding the rule are imbued with privilege. Rule
801(d)(2)(A) presupposes that a criminal defendant who wishes to
contradict an out-of-court statement at trial will have “every
opportunity” to do so.108 In fact, other evidence rules conspire to
diminish a defendant’s likelihood to testify at trial, especially
defendants of color. As one example, a defendant’s otherwiseexcludable prior criminal conviction is admissible as proof of
“character for truthfulness” if the defendant testifies.109 As Black
and Hispanic men are arrested, prosecuted, and convicted at a rate
that far exceeds Caucasians, the rule is especially prejudicial to
those defendants.110 Additionally, an emerging understanding of
how coercive police interrogation strategies engender false
confessions, primarily as to suspects of color, exposes the
threadbare reliability of opposing party statements.111 Therefore,
an amendment to ensure a criminal defendant’s statement
possesses a “guarantee of trustworthiness” is long overdue. To
achieve this safeguard, the government would be required to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence prior to trial that a statement is
reliable. Limited judicial review would benefit both parties. For the
104. See supra note 85.
105. See supra note 88; see also Bolitho, supra note 40, 199 (Statements
admitted under Rule 801(d)(2) are “one of the most common reasons why outof-court statements are admitted during trials.”).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2018).
107. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
108. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 361.
109. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (1), 609.
110. See The Sentencing Project, supra note 66, at 1.
111. See supra notes 60-64, 70-76 and accompanying text.
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government, a pre-trial determination that a defendant’s statement
bears indicia of reliability would solidify its proof at trial and protect
testifying officers against cross-examination about the statement’s
veracity. For defendants, the review would provide much-needed
scrutiny of nefarious interrogation tactics that too-often elicit false
confessions.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E),
governing statements by alleged co-conspirators, imposes a similar
requirement.112 In applying this rule, a trial court must ascertain,
as a preliminary matter, the existence of a conspiracy, its pendency,
whether the party against who it was offered was a member, and
whether the statement was made in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy.113 The standard of proof to be applied by the court is
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., “more likely than not.”114 While
a court may consider the contents of the statement itself, its
contents “are not alone sufficient to establish” the preliminary
facts.115 Federal appellate courts uniformly require some
independent evidence, including “the corroboration of facts
contained in the statements of the [alleged] co-conspirators.”116 A
comparable pre-trial process must be applied to opposing party
statements attributed to defendants and offered by the prosecution
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). As part of this process, courts should allow
defense experts to opine about the correlation between coercive
police interrogation techniques and false statements.117
Rule 804(b)(3), controlling “statements against interest” by a
now-unavailable witness-declarant, incorporates comparable
protections.118 According to the Advisory Committee Notes and
judicial interpretation, the rule “is founded upon the commonsense
notion that reasonable people, even [those] who are not especially
112. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 (1987) (holding that
admissibility of a co-conspirator’s statement against the defendant requires
that the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence “the existence of
a conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant [and the
defendant]”). An amendment to the rule codified the holding. See 1997
Amendment Committee Note on Amendment to Rule 801(d)(2).
113. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-176 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).
114. Id.
115. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 26.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373, 380 (7th Cir. 1997).
117. In a similar vein, Professors Richard Leo and Steven Drizin propose
that, on the defendant’s motion, courts should hold “pretrial reliability
hearings” to determine the veracity of a defendant’s confession. See Richard A.
Leo et al., Bring Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in
the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 484 (2006); see also Mark
Costanzo, Netta Shaked-Schroer & Katherine Vinson, Juror Beliefs About
Police Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert Testimony, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 231, 234 (2010) (describing a 2010 study of prospective jurors that
revealed that “a large majority reported that it would be helpful to hear expert
testimony about interrogation techniques and reasons why a defendant might
falsely confess to a crime”).
118. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).
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honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they
believe them to be true.”119 In 2010, amidst exoneration-driven
revelations about false statements made during coercive police
interrogations, the rule was amended to require “corroborating
circumstances
that
clearly
indicate
[the
statement’s]
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case[.].”120 Those
circumstances may include whether the declarant voluntarily
relinquished his or her Miranda rights, whether the statement was
made “to curry favor with authorities,” or whether the statement
bore “indicia of trustworthiness of the specific, ‘essential’ assertions,
not merely of other facts contained [therein].”121 While Rule
804(b)(3) requires a declarant’s unavailability at trial, its logic holds
true to statements made by criminal defendants: the significant risk
of police coercion coupled with the outsize evidentiary value of
inculpatory statements demands the government’s corroboration of
trustworthiness.

VI. CONCLUSION
In the framers’ vision, the Federal Rules of Evidence “should
be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly . . . to the
end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”122
To hold the framers to that laudatory goal, an amended Rule
801(d)(2)(A) must consider two realities. First, law enforcement
officers are trained to pursue interrogation strategies that value
confessions and convictions at the expense of a “just determination”
of actual guilt. Further, the rule disproportionately impacts
defendants of color and endangers wrongful convictions. The
changes we propose to Rule 801(d)(2)(A) are modest, especially
when measured against the incalculable harm suffered by the
Central Park Five and other defendants of color over its unjust
application.

119. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994); FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3), Advisory Committee Note (citing Hillman v. Northwest Engineering
Co., 346 F.2d. 668 (6th Cir. 1965)) (“The circumstantial guaranty of reliability
for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason
that they are true”).
120. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).
121. United States v. Jackson, 540 F.3d 578, 589 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 975
(1997)
122. FED. R. EVID. 102.

